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The Economics of Disaster Relief
GIUSEPPE DARI-MATTIACCI and MICHAEL G. FAURE
We distinguish among three types of actions that can be taken to alleviate the
consequences of natural disasters: precautionary efforts (made ex ante), relief
efforts (made in the immediate aftermath of a disaster), and recovery efforts
(made ex post). We argue that recognizing this distinction lessens many of the
problems that the literature attributes to government intervention and hence
expands the scope of government action following disasters. Relief is less likely
than recovery to generate over-supply by the government and over-reliance by
victims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Government intervention in relation to catastrophic events has a poor
reputation. It is criticized in the literature for being excessive ex post and
insufficient ex ante. Often, ex post intervention could be efficiently substi-
tuted by cheaper measures taken before the disaster. For instance, prior to
hurricane Katrina there was a lack of investment in Louisiana’s levee
systems, inadequate zoning regulations, and an absence of emergency plan-
ning (Houck 2006; Waugh 2005), but various government authorities “par-
ticipated in the race to provide relief” ex post, with costs of over $100 million
(Depoorter 2006, 112). The same story can be told of hurricane Irene, which,
a few years later, destroyed homes, businesses, and roads, and caused over
$15 billion in damage. The flood had these disastrous effects because of
unregulated human activities, such as the armoring of the rivers, the hard-
ening of flood plains, and the development of watersheds (Pidot 2012).
Yet government intervention is crucial, not only to alleviate the immediate
consequences of disasters, but also to reduce their long-term effects
(Noy 2009). Thus, understanding the causes for the failure of government
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intervention is crucial to better disaster management. The evidence points to
politics and strategic reactions to the prospect of disasters as the sources of
the above-mentioned problems. Politicians usually have short time horizons
and tend to avoid thinking about low-probability events until they occur
(Kunreuther 2010a). Precautionary expenditures generate immediate costs
and thus put pressure on the public budget while producing gains only if a
disaster materializes, that is, in a very small percentage of the cases. More-
over, a disaster that causes little damage is likely to go largely unnoticed,
thereby further reducing the political gains of precautionary efforts; invisible
and improbable gains are traded against conspicuous and sure costs
(Depoorter 2006). Ex post intervention, instead, provides a salient occasion
for political visibility and is likely to be used as a stage for political
campaigns. Because recovery efforts are very visible, political entities will
compete to provide them, leading to excessive expenditures ex post. There are
high political (electoral) rewards attached to ex post intervention, and recent
evidence shows a correlation between elections and realized ex post expen-
ditures; disasters occurring in election years attract more ex post funding
relative to disasters in other years (Michel-Kerjan 2010). Research has also
shown that, in the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agen-
cy’s (FEMA) disaster expenditures are higher in states that have congressio-
nal representation on FEMA oversight committees. Half of all disaster relief,
the research shows, is motivated by politics rather than altruism (Garrett,
Marsh, and Marshall 2006; Garrett and Sobel 2003). In addition, popular
beliefs and news coverage tend to overstate the risk of looting, anarchy, and
violence in disaster areas. Therefore, politically motivated intervention might
put too much weight on these news-sensitive problems and hence divert
resources away from humanitarian intervention (Sun 2011a).
Leveraging this criticism, law and economics scholars have forcefully
argued against ex post government intervention (see, among many others,
Epstein 1996; Kaplow 1991). The point that we develop in this article is that
the arguments made in the literature against government intervention hold
for recovery (compensation) but not for immediate disaster relief. Thus, we
aim to carve out a broader scope for government intervention than that
advanced in extant analyses. We first argue that a distinction should be made
between three classes of activities involved in disaster management: precau-
tion, relief, and recovery. Precautionary efforts are made ex ante (at time −1),
often months or even years before a disaster strikes; relief efforts are made in
the immediate aftermath of a disaster (at time 0); and recovery efforts are
made ex post (at time +1), after the disaster, and are intended to return
conditions to those that prevailed ex ante. A somewhat similar distinction is
made by Mileti (1999) among preparedness, response, and recovery.
We argue that there are strong reasons for immediate, ad hoc disaster relief
by the government. The need for rapid action, combined with economies of
scale and the public good character of immediate disaster relief, increases the
scope for government intervention and mitigates the inefficiencies, noted
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above, which affect recovery efforts. Although there might be political incen-
tives to oversupply relief and incentives for victims to over-rely on ex post
government intervention, relief reduces the social cost of disasters. Thus,
expenditures on relief save precautionary and recovery costs. In contrast,
recovery only shifts the costs of disasters from victims to government agen-
cies and hence does not affect the optimal investments in precaution and
relief. This fundamental difference between relief and recovery drives our
analysis.
In Part II, we review the literature against ex post government intervention
and show that it does not generally distinguish between relief and recovery,
a distinction that we introduce in Part III. In Part IV, we examine this
distinction against the available evidence, which points to major expenditures
in relief rather than recovery, supporting our claim that government inter-
vention might be less undesirable than it seems. In Part V, we present a
formal model explaining the interdependencies between precaution, relief,
and recovery. In Part VI, we draw some lessons from the model and discuss
the different effects of recovery and relief. Part VII defines a notion of
optimal relief and Part VIII concludes.
II. EX POST GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND ITS CRITICS
Certain law and economics scholars have strongly argued against ex post
government intervention after disasters. Epstein (1996) has called this type of
ex post compensation “catastrophic responses to catastrophic risk,” and
Gollier (2005, 25) has argued that “solidarity kills market insurance” (see
also Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007; Priest 1996). There is empirical
evidence regarding the effects of disaster relief on the demand for crop
insurance, showing that producers’ beliefs about the availability of disaster
relief has a significant negative impact on their willingness to purchase insur-
ance (Trebilcock and Daniels 2006; Van Asseldonk, Meuwissen, and Huirne
2002). Accordingly, Kunreuther (1968, 2006, 2010a) has repeatedly and pow-
erfully argued for the introduction of a mandatory comprehensive insurance
program.
These effects further reinforce the problem. Helpless, uninsured victims
are more vulnerable to disasters and therefore require more ex post aid,
which in turn makes the disaster more salient and politicians more eager to
stage a rescue. This negative spiral results in a less-safe environment and
higher death tolls (Pidot 2012). There are some (isolated) voices who call for
different solutions (see, for instance, Farber 2007). Among them, Van
Langendonck (2007) has argued that the government should provide social
insurance for natural disasters, whereby compensation for disasters would be
provided in the same way as social security is provisioned. However, when he
discusses the scope of social insurance, he essentially refers to immediate help
through a specialized task force (compensating local authorities for the cost
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of emergency intervention) rather than long-term reconstruction efforts
(refunding local authorities for the cost of compensation payments to victims
for personal damage). He explicitly argues that it is unadvisable that such a
fund should be used to compensate individuals or enterprises for losses
related to private property damage.
The problem, as powerfully shown by Viscusi (2010), is that following a
major disaster, society (and thus politicians) suffers from a hold-up problem.
It is simply politically impossible to deny assistance “once there are identified
victims and their stories are featured on the evening news” (ibid., 146). In
other words, the (political) pressure to provide relief to victims ex post is very
strong and leads to the so-called Samaritan’s dilemma: the government
grants ex post compensation, even if this is likely to have negative ex ante
effects on incentives (Coate 1995). This problem is also referred to as charity
hazard, and scholars have argued that the main advantage of insurance-
based solutions is that they can provide incentives to invest in hazard
mitigation (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, and Ranger 2013; Kleindorfer,
Kunreuther, and Ou-Yang 2012). The same authors also propose to restruc-
ture the United States’ National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to
provide better incentives for hazard mitigation. Kousky and Kunreuther
(2013) also criticize the current NFIP for addressing insurance affordability
through discounted premiums. They instead propose a means-tested insur-
ance voucher program, coupled with a loan program for investments in
hazard mitigation.
A mandatory comprehensive disaster insurance model has existed in
France since 1987 and, although there are criticisms of its specific institu-
tional design (see Van den Bergh and Faure 2006), there is general support
for the French model, which is not only receiving increased attention in
scholarship, but has also been recently introduced in Belgium and is under
consideration in other countries (Bruggeman, Faure, and Haritz 2011;
Bruggeman 2010). Politicians, however, often oppose the introduction of
mandatory insurance as larger political gains can be obtained through ad hoc
measures after a disaster. (For a comparative analysis of various European
systems, see Schwarze, Schwindt, Wagner, and Weck-Hannemann 2012; see
also Paudel 2012.)
III. DEFINITIONS: PRECAUTION, RELIEF, AND RECOVERY
We propose a distinction between three classes of activities that bear on the
magnitude and probability of losses related to disasters. Before elaborating
on our distinction, note that there is a difference between technological,
man-made disasters and natural catastrophes. Examples of technological
disasters are oil spills, nuclear accidents, explosions in particular plants, or
fire in a public building. Natural catastrophes include heavy rainfall, floods,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and many others (Faure 2013).
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We mainly focus on natural disasters. The reason is that considering man-
made disasters would introduce concerns as to the optimal mix of victims’
and tortfeasors’ precaution, which complicates the analysis without affecting
our main point. Our observations about the differences between relief and
recovery also apply to man-made disasters.
We distinguish between precautionary efforts (made ex ante, at time −1,
such as building dikes), relief efforts (made in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster, at time 0, such as providing shelter, food, and medical assistance to
victims), and recovery efforts (made ex post, at time +1, such as funds for
reconstructing homes and infrastructure). Figure 1 offers a graphical repre-
sentation of these categories, and the following sections expand on them (for
a recent bipartite taxonomy and analysis of ex ante versus ex post policy
tools, see Iacobucci, Trebilcock, and Haider 2001).
A. PRECAUTION
Precautionary efforts encompass all those actions that can be taken ex ante in
order to prevent an event from happening, reduce its probability, or mitigate
the seriousness of its consequences (Leonard and Howitt 2010). Precaution-
ary efforts can be taken by the government or, depending upon the scale, by
individuals. For example, property owners in flood-prone regions can elevate
their houses, and people living in earthquake-prone regions can bolt the
structures of various installations to the foundation of their homes
(Kunreuther 2010b). It has been stressed by O’Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner
(1976) that many disasters can be prevented and that a lack of precautionary
measures is often the real reason why natural events have catastrophic
consequences. Yet, when the scale of the measures needed is sufficiently large,
precautionary efforts are more efficiently undertaken by the government. For
example, governments can build levees to prevent flooding and structures to
protect coasts from tsunamis, and can introduce earthquake-warning
systems (Zeckhauser 1996, 134). An important task of the government is the
issuance of zoning regulations—for example, prohibiting constructions in
flood-prone areas or prescribing particular building techniques in areas
prone to earthquakes (Sun 2011b; Ellickson 1973). As Trebilcock and
Daniels (2006, 91–92) note:
In the case of hurricanes, a number of important potential precautionary
strategies that are designed to minimize the expected costs or consequences













Figure 1. Three Types of Disaster Efforts.
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are assuming to be exogenous) have many of the characteristics of public goods
and if left purely to private markets are likely to be under-demanded and
under-supplied as a result of collective action problems.
For example, in the case of Katrina, Shughart (2006) shows that no effective
precautionary measures were taken before Katrina was announced because
of bureaucratic myopia, bureaucratic inertia, and corruption. With respect
to particular disasters, such as a terrorist attack, the argument is made
that little can be expected from civilians in terms of preventive measures. The
goal of a terrorist attack is often to disrupt society. Terrorists may adopt
strategies to which governments can potentially react more effectively than
individuals. Governments may also have more information about ongoing
terrorist groups’ activities, through intelligence services (Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan 2005). The same is true of large-scale infrastructure projects,
needed to prevent catastrophes (e.g., building dikes to defend against
tsunamis). These are public goods that would not be provided through
private action and may thus require government intervention.
Individuals can limit their exposure to risk primarily by optimizing their
location and through other, similar decisions. Examples of the latter include
not placing valuables in basements vulnerable to flooding or, in earthquake-
prone areas, choosing a type of construction not highly vulnerable to
earthquakes.1 A problem with some precautionary actions is that they may
not fully prevent damage while creating an illusion of complete safety. For
instance, the construction of levees reduces the probability of flooding, but by
inducing settlement in flood-prone areas, the construction may increase the
magnitude of harm, should a flood occur (Mileti 1999). In our analysis, we
focus exclusively on victims’ precaution. However, all of our arguments also
apply to cases where it is efficient that the government takes precaution. As
will be clear from the analysis, our argument is weaker when victims’ pre-
caution is efficient and hence applies a fortiori to cases of government pre-
caution, where the dilution of incentives due to relief is less serious.2
B. RELIEF
Relief effort consists of executing an effective, damage-limiting response
immediately after an event. For example, in the United States, federal relief
efforts consist of “coordinating necessary decisions, support[ing] search and
rescue efforts, and [. . .] provid[ing] public health, medical and mental health
support at casualty evacuation points and refugee shelters” (Report: Disaster
Evacuation, 2–3). As Sugarman (2007, 32) notes, “[i]n the immediate after-
math of a hurricane, for example, people may need basic temporary shelter;
then they may need transitional housing while they are finding a new place to
settle or their former homes are cleaned up, fixed and/or rebuilt; and they
may need help with those processes.”
Because disasters usually strike unannounced, relief requires a rapid coor-
dinated effort, the pooling of significant resources and manpower, and the
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mobilization of communications and medical infrastructures. In addition,
when a population is evacuated, it is necessary to provide policing against
looting and outbreaks of violence. The problem, however, is not only logis-
tics or funding. Rather, these activities often require special legal means that
only a local or central government body can provide. Such means include
control of police and military forces deployed in affected areas; the ability to
communicate effectively with the population; the imposition of restrictions
with respect to access to, or exit from, particular areas; and the power to seize
or expropriate private property.
C. RECOVERY
Recovery effort is ex post intervention needed to return the social welfare
trajectory to where it would have been had the disaster never occurred
(Leonard and Howitt 2010). Recovery consists of two kinds of effort: recon-
struction activities and victim compensation. Reconstruction activities are
typically aimed at restoring public services and the country’s infrastructure
such as roads, harbors, or railways. Examples of victim compensation
include government payments, which go beyond immediate relief, to victims
of disasters. These payments are usually not merely aimed at the provision of
public health (medical and mental health support at the moment of the
disaster), but also occur at a later stage. They are usually intended to com-
pensate people for property loss and, in some cases, are organized in a
structured way—for example, in Belgium (Durant 2006) and Austria
(Hinghofer-Szalskay and Koch 2006)—via a publicly financed disaster com-
pensation fund that pays (limited) amounts of compensation to disaster
victims. However, the most common way of compensating disaster victims
(as part of recovery efforts) is on an ad hoc basis.
This type of recovery effort is often, but not exclusively, inspired by politi-
cal motives and can be found on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, such
payments took place in Germany after the Elbe flooding of 2002, where €8.1
billion were made available to victims of flooding (Magnus 2006). In Italy, on
average €3.5–4 billion per year are spent to indemnify victims of damage
caused by catastrophic events (Monti and Chiaves 2006). In the United
States, after Katrina, as of February 2006, “$88 billion in federal aid had
been allocated for relief, recovery and rebuilding, with another $20 billion
requested to help victims of the storm and to rebuild the region” (Report:
Progress Made). Additionally, in Japan, generous support funds, reconstruc-
tion funds, and financial aid for disaster victims (especially of earthquakes)
exist, and following the recent Fukushima incident of March 2011, a corpo-
ration was created to compensate victims (Faure and Liu 2012). To ensure
full compensation, the Japanese government has decided to issue government
bonds of 2 trillion yen ($26 billion) to help the operator TEPCO (Tokyo
Electric Power Company) pay compensation and is considering approving a
supplementary budget of 3 trillion yen ($38 billion; Faure and Liu 2012).
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Largely, recovery expenditures simply shift the costs of the disaster from
victims to government agencies. At the recovery stage, it is typically too late
to reduce the costs of an accident; the question is only who pays for them. As
mentioned, we focus on cases in which victims’ precaution is efficient, and,
hence, government recovery is undesirable because it reduces victims’
incentives. Yet, our results are not based on this assumption, and they remain
valid in cases of government precaution. The reason is that the differences
between relief and recovery that we identify do not depend on who should
pay for recovery.
IV. RELIEF VERSUS RECOVERY IN RECENT NATURAL DISASTERS
We will now discuss the spending in the aftermath of particular recent disas-
ters in order to examine the relative amounts of spending for relief versus
recovery. Obviously, there are some difficulties in this respect since data are
often lacking or contradictory. It is also not always possible to provide sharp
distinctions between relief and recovery, and for recent disasters (like
Fukushima) the final amounts are not known yet. Notwithstanding these
caveats, the data on a few recent disasters shed light on the central point of
our article.
A. KATRINA
Katrina made landfall near the Louisiana–Mississippi border on the morning
of August 29, 2005, and would become the most expensive natural disaster in
US history, and also one of the deadliest (Report: A Failure of Initiative 7).
Total costs of Katrina were (as of February 2006) estimated to be $96 billion.
300,000 homes were destroyed or uninhabitable and 1,330 people died. That
made Katrina far more expensive than the terrorist attacks on 9/11, whose
total estimated damage was valued at $18 billion (Report: Lessons Learned
7, 211).
Relief to the victims could be provided via the local authorities on the basis
of the Stafford Act. An individual or household could receive a maximum of
$26,200 of Individual and Household Program (IHP) assistance through
FEMA, financed by a cost sharing between the federal government and the
state. The Stafford Act determines the federal assistance as well as the finan-
cial assistance provided by FEMA, which can include direct payments,
grants, loans, and insurance. Funding is capped at $5 million. In case of an
emergency declaration when the president has declared an event a major
disaster, no financial limit applies, and states can request federal assistance
(Report: Performance Review 13, 16–17; Report: Lessons Learned 18). In the
bipartisan committee report A Failure of Initiative, an amount of $63 billion
was held to be allocated to “disaster relief.” By November 30, 2005, $19.3
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billion had been paid “to relieve the immediate suffering of individuals and
families, clear debris, reimburse federal agencies for the costs of technical and
direct assistance, and support federal operations such as search and rescue
and delivery of consumables” (Report: A Failure of Initiative 310). The
report shows that the money went, inter alia, to personal needs that were
not met by insurance and temporary housing (including vouchers for hotel/
motel rooms and mobile homes), debris removal, damage inspections, hazard
mitigation, etc. A later Senate report refers to a total amount of $88 billion
that the federal government had committed as of March 8, 2006 “to the
response, recovery and rebuilding efforts” (Report: A Nation still Unpre-
pared 112).
Interestingly, many of the different reports issued after Katrina point to
serious underinvestments in preparedness, particularly by public authorities
(both FEMA and state authorities; reports on desirable precautionary efforts
by individuals that were not taken are not available). For example, A Failure
of Initiative reports that FEMA sustained losses of $80 million and $90
million in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, respectively, and that “these budget
reductions were preventing FEMA officials from maintaining adequate levels
of trained and ready staff” (Report: A Failure of Initiative 156). Similar data
come from the report by the Department of Homeland Security reporting,
inter alia, that between 1995 and 2003, FEMA’s budget decreased to such an
extent that it was left “unable to conduct a large scale catastrophic event
exercise” (Report: A Performance Review 129).
These data on Katrina of course do not provide hard evidence to
illustrate our points; the reports do not sufficiently distinguish between
relief and recovery. However, when looking at the detailed items for
which the emergency payments were made, one notices that a large extent
goes to the immediate needs of victims, or to reconstruction by local
authorities, and only a limited amount to victim compensation. Many do
criticize the way in which FEMA has provided relief and reconstruction,
pointing at particular inefficiencies, such as financing reconstruction in the
same flood-prone areas, but the amounts awarded for relief were substan-
tially larger than amounts awarded for recovery (if at all). Moreover,
the limited information available on precaution seems indeed to underscore
the point of underinvestment ex ante and that relief provided by FEMA
was not of the perfectly tailored and ready type that we advocate in the
analysis.
B. ELBE
Various studies on the Elbe flood of 2002 also provide information on the
amount of losses and their financing (Mechler and Weichselgartner 2003).
The official estimate in 2002 was that total losses resulting from the Elbe
flooding would amount to approximately €9.2 billion. Table 1 provides an
overview of the losses.
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Again, apparently large amounts were used for relief, but in this case
damage to private households was also considerable. Part of the available
compensation (of €9.5 billion) was used for emergency relief and part for
reconstruction as Table 2 shows.
There is no indication, however, of how the precise division between
emergency relief and reconstruction took place, although one has the impres-
sion that larger amounts were paid in reconstruction than in relief. The Elbe
study also provides an interesting tabulation of seven major natural disasters
around the world, showing that in fact large parts of the losses (around or
over 50 percent) are not compensated at all.
V. A MODEL OF PRECAUTION, RELIEF, AND RECOVERY
In this part, we introduce a simple model of precaution, relief, and recovery.
The model offers a precise characterization of our notions and of the inter-
actions among them; the results will also be discussed informally in the
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following sections. Modeling a simplified situation has the advantage of
allowing us to zero in on the important ingredients of our analysis. When
necessary, we offer comments on the effects of variables that are left out of
the model, showing that they do not affect the main results.
In the model, there are two actors: a representative victim of a natural
disaster and the government. The timing is as in Figure 1. At time −1, the
victim sets the level of precaution p that affects the probability of disasters. In
the real world, the government can also invest in precautionary effort. We
show in the appendix that adding government precaution to the model does
not affect the results.
At time 0, a disaster occurs. Disasters are of two types: there are minor
disasters, characterized by dL (low damages), and major disasters, character-
ized by dH (high damages). Without loss of generality,3 we assume that 0 < dL
< dH < 1. In the aftermath of a disaster, relief effort r can be applied to reduce
the magnitude of the damages. We consider two scenarios: one in which the
government sets r (at time 0) and one in which the victim sets r (at time −1).
Finally, at time +1, the government provides for some recovery by paying
a fraction s of the damages. We will first solve the model by using backward
induction, hence starting from time +1, and consider the two relief scenarios
separately. Then, we will compare them and draw some general lessons. In
particular, we will stress the difference between government intervention in
relief at time 0 and government intervention in recovery at time +1. The
mathematical proofs of the various propositions discussed below are pro-
vided in the appendix.
A. CASE-SPECIFIC RELIEF EFFORT IS PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT
We start with the case in which relief effort is provided by the government
and is case specific; that is, it is chosen at time 0 after having observed
whether damages are high or low. We postulate that the government can do
so, due to its greater budget, superior information, and capacity to mobilize
resources. Figure 2 depicts the timing of the actions that the parties can take.
1. Recovery
At time +1, after a disaster has occurred, the government pays a portion 0 ≤
s ≤ 1 of the damages of major disasters. Nothing is paid for minor disasters.
This formulation captures the idea that major disasters attract media atten-
tion and are electorally salient. This framework is very general, as s can be set
to 0 (the victim pays the full cost) or to 1 (the government picks up the entire
bill).
2. Relief
At time 0, relief effort can be exerted in order to reduce the magnitude of
the loss. If a minor disaster has occurred, the magnitude of the damages is
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dL2 / 4r; otherwise, if the disaster is major, damages are dH2 / 4r. This formu-
lation captures the idea that investing r ≥ 0 in relief immediately after the
disaster reduces the magnitude of damages. In addition, it captures the fact
that investments exhibit decreasing marginal productivity: that is, the initial
investments reduce the losses by a larger extent than successive investments.
One could of course use a much more general formulation that does not
assume a specific functional form but has the property of inducing decreasing
marginal reduction in the magnitude of the losses. However, using a simple,
specific, functional form has the advantage of providing easy-to-interpret
results.
If the disaster is minor, the optimal level of relief minimizes the social cost
of disasters—that is, damages plus relief effort—and hence solves
Minr Ld r r2 4 +[ ]
To find the level of r that minimizes the cost above we use a standard
technique. We calculate the first derivative of the expression above and
set it to zero, which gives us the first-order condition. Simplifying the
resulting expression, we obtain the values of interest. The first-order
condition of the expression above yields that the socially optimal level of
relief is
r dL L* = 2 (1)
Similarly, if damages are high, the socially optimal level of relief is
r dH H* = 2 (2)
Note that, as one might have expected, the socially optimal level of relief
effort is greater if damages are high, rH* > rL*; that is, it is socially optimal to
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Figure 2. Government Relief.
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3. Precaution
At time −1, the victim chooses a level of precaution 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Precaution has
the effect of shifting probability from high to low damages. For instance,
seismic retrofitting makes it more likely that an earthquake will result in only
minor consequences rather than causing a major disaster. This idea is cap-
tured by the assumption that low damages occur with probability p while
high damages occur with probability 1 − p, so that by increasing precaution
effort p the victim makes it more likely that the disaster will be minor. In
order to lower the probability of high damages, the victim bears a cost of
precaution equal to p2 / 2, which exhibits the usual properties of increasing
marginal cost of effort. As with r above, this formulation captures initial
investments in precaution as more productive than additional investments.
Again, the choice of a specific functional form is made for simplicity and
allows for explicit results.
From a social point of view, the optimal level of precaution accounts
both for damages and for the costs of relief effort taken in each case. That
is, the victim should ideally set precaution effort in anticipation of the
effects and the costs of relief in both high-damage and low-damage cases
(the first two addenda in the expression below) and accounting for the costs
of precaution (the third addendum). Thus, the socially optimal level of pre-
caution solves
Min * * * *p L L L H H Hp d r r p d r r p2 2 24 1 4 2+( ) + −( ) +( ) +[ ]
After substituting the levels of relief provided by the government, rL* and rH*,
we can rewrite the social cost minimization problem as
Minp L Hpd p d p+ −( ) +[ ]1 22
The first-order condition yields that, given optimal relief effort by the gov-
ernment, the socially optimal level of precaution is
p d dH L* = − (3)
Intuitively, the desirable level of precaution is such that the marginal cost of
precaution on the left-hand side of (3) is equal to the marginal benefit of
precaution on the right-hand side of (3), as measured by the difference
between high and low damages. However, when choosing precaution, victims
do not bear the costs of relief directly—as they are most likely spread among
the general population through taxation or are partially funded by charitable
organizations—and hence they choose a level of precaution that only mini-
mizes the damages. Moreover, if the government pays a portion s of the
damages at time +1, this eventuality will be taken into account while setting
precaution. Therefore, the victim’s minimization problem does not account
for the full costs of relief and damages and hence is different from the social
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cost minimization problem. The expression below only includes the costs of
high- and low-damage disasters and the cost of precaution
Min * *p L L H Hp d r p s d r p2 2 24 1 1 4 2( ) + −( ) −( )( ) +[ ]
After substituting rL* and rH*, we can write
Minp L Hpd p s d p2 1 1 2 22+ −( ) −( ) +[ ]
The first-order condition yields that, given optimal relief effort, the level of
precaution chosen by victims is4
p s d dH L∧ = −( ) −[ ]1 2 (4)
4. Results with Government Relief
The two important expressions that we will compare are (3) and (4). There
are two inefficiencies associated with government intervention in disaster
management, and both reduce the level of precaution taken by victims below
the socially optimal level, so that p∧ < p*. On the one hand, government
recovery makes the victim internalize less than the full damages resulting
from major disasters and hence dilutes the victim’s incentives to invest in
precaution. As can be seen from (4), victims set precaution effort while
anticipating that they will not bear a portion s of the high damages. On the
other hand, government relief efficiently reduces the consequences of disas-
ters, but its costs are not considered by victims. As can be seen from (4)
victims bear at most half of the total cost of disasters compared to (3), the
other half consisting in the externalized costs of relief.
Proposition 1. Both government recovery and government relief dilute the victim’s
incentives to take precaution: p∧ < p*.
B. VICTIM’S RELIEF
In the second scenario, relief effort is set by the representative victim at a
general level, irrespective of damages; this is due to the fact that victims do
not dispose of sufficient budget and capacity to mobilize the resources that
are necessary to optimally respond to each type of disaster. Rather, the victim
prepares in advance a one-size-fits-all response (sets aside food supplies to
cope with emergencies, for instance). These supplies will typically be exces-
sive in low-damage disasters and insufficient in high-damage ones. In other
words, the information about the magnitude of damages cannot be optimally
used to tailor the relief response to the specifics of the disaster. This idea is
captured by the assumption that the victim chooses relief effort at time −1
(before the disaster) and then applies it at time 0. Figure 3 depicts this
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scenario. There are other ways to capture the victims’ limited ability to
respond to disasters, such as capping the maximum relief effort that the
victim is able to apply. Yet, these alternative formulations yield analogous
results.
1. Recovery
At time +1, the government pays a portion 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 of the damages of major
disasters, as before.
2. Relief and Precaution
At time 0, the victim applies relief effort set at time −1. Since the victim sets
both relief and precaution at time −1, before the disaster, we can analyze
them together. Because the victim pays for relief, relief costs now show up in
the victims’ minimization problem, but, as before, the victim anticipates that
the government will pay for a portion of the recovery costs and hence does
not fully internalize the damages resulting from major disasters. Hence, the
victim’s minimization problem is
Min p r L Hpd r p s d r r p,( ) + −( ) −( ) + +[ ]2 2 24 1 1 4 2
The first term is the cost of minor disasters; the second term is the cost of
major disasters, accounting for the fact that recovery is partially paid by the
government; the third term is the cost of relief now borne by the victim; the
fourth and last term is the cost of precaution by the victim. The first-order
conditions yield levels of precaution and relief such that5
p s d d rH L∧∧ ∧∧= −( ) −[ ]1 42 2 (5)
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Figure 3. Victims’ Relief.
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3. Results with Victims’ Relief and Comparison with Government Relief
Victims’ relief is not subject to the same inefficiencies that affect government
relief. Unlike with government relief, now the victim bears relief cost, but
relief is inefficient because it is applied uniformly to both minor and major
disasters. Typically, victims’ relief will be too high for minor disasters and too
low for major ones precisely because the victim is not capable of tailoring
relief effort optimally to the circumstances. These inefficiencies are not due to
moral hazard, but rather to the fact that victims have inferior information
and more limited resources than the government. This can be seen by com-
paring (1) and (2) with (6).
Proposition 2. Victims’ relief lies in between the socially optimal levels of govern-
ment relief: rL* < r∧∧ < rH*.
In addition, since relief is not at its differentiated socially optimal levels, the
victim compensates relief inefficiencies by increasing the level of precaution,
as can be seen by comparing (4) with (5). This suggests that when relief is paid
for by victims, the traditional moral hazard problem is mitigated, resulting in
higher levels of precaution.
Proposition 3. The level of precaution with victims’ relief is greater than the level
of precaution with government relief: p∧ < p∧∧.
A second inefficiency arises from the fact that the victim does not bear the full
cost of major disasters, which further affects the incentives to invest in relief
and precaution. Note further that it is not necessarily the case that govern-
ment recovery reduces both relief and precaution. In fact, a lower level of
relief makes precaution more valuable so that the effect of recovery on
precaution could be countered by the effect of reduced relief on precaution.
Vice versa, lower precaution makes it more important to apply relief effort.
The results will depend on the specifics of the case and, more precisely, on the
size of dH and dL. Summing up, if the government invests more in recovery s,
either relief or precaution by the victim will fall; sometimes, but not always,
both relief and precaution will fall.
Proposition 4. Government recovery dilutes the victims’ incentives to invest in
relief and/or precaution.
VI. THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT RELIEF
AND GOVERNMENT RECOVERY
In the previous parts, we have shown that government relief and recovery are
similar in that they might dilute the victim’s incentives to take precaution
ex ante. The intuition is straightforward: if the government provides relief
or recovery, victims do not pay the full costs of disasters and hence reduce
their precautionary efforts below the socially optimal level. In this sense,
government intervention is a substitute for victims’ precaution. However,
relief and recovery are different in fundamental respects.
First, the dilution of precaution incentives caused by recovery is entirely
inefficient, because recovery does not reduce the social cost of accidents but
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only shifts part of the social cost to the taxpayers. Thus, the damages caused
by a disaster are unaffected by recovery, and no reduction in precaution
should be warranted. In contrast, relief reduces the social cost of accidents,
and hence it is optimal to reduce precaution somewhat. The reduction in
precaution could be excessive, due to the fact that victims do not bear the full
relief costs, but is not entirely inefficient.
The second important difference between government relief and govern-
ment recovery stems from the fact that while government recovery ineffi-
ciently distorts victims’ incentives, government relief reduces the costs of
recovery, and hence has a positive ex post effect, because it reduces the
damages that will have to be paid for either by the victim or by the
government. We will expand on these issues in the following section.
A. THE EFFECTS OF RECOVERY ON PRECAUTION
Substitutability is the basis for the general criticism in law and economics
literature, namely, that the availability of solutions ex post might reduce
incentives to look for cheaper solutions ex ante. The literature has empha-
sized that a too generous intervention ex post will affect incentives for
precaution. Victims may count on being bailed out ex post by politicians
(Epstein 1996; Zeckhauser 1996), and to the extent that political intervention
is expected, recovery reduces the incentives of victims to take precautions.
Politicians themselves may be more inclined to invest in visible, politically
rewarding ex post recovery efforts than in less visible ex ante precautionary
measures, the political benefits of which are less clear. Thus, there are politi-
cal incentives for politicians to substitute recovery for precaution and for
victims to free ride on ex post intervention by reducing their ex ante precau-
tionary expenditures (Depoorter 2006).
Shughart (2006, 44) nicely describes how recovery can negatively affect
precaution (referring to the case of Katrina):
Shifting a large portion of the cost of recovery to the tax payers encourages
people to rebuild who would not have chosen to do so if they instead shoul-
dered the full costs themselves. The prospect of receiving federal and state
reconstruction assistance after the next hurricane strikes supplies incentives for
others to relocate their homes and businesses from inland areas of comparative
safety to vulnerable coastal areas.
Equally, Mileti (1999, 137) argues that individuals typically underinvest in
precautions against hazards: “People typically are unaware of the hazards
they face . . . and rely heavily on emergency relief when the need arises.”
These problems, hence, mainly result from inefficient compensation nega-
tively affecting the incentives of victims for precaution; the situation is
different as far as relief is concerned.
Reconstruction typically involves repairing infrastructure and is usually
undertaken by government and not by individuals. Therefore, whereas
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compensation may negatively affect ex ante incentives for precaution on the
part of individuals, this is not necessarily the case for reconstruction. For
instance, the fact that the government will reconstruct a destroyed bridge (a
public good) ex post will not affect the ex ante incentives of potential victims
to take precautions. Yet politicians themselves may prefer to intervene ex
post, with extended budgets and under the watchful eye of the media, rather
than ex ante, when intervention is not salient and its benefits latent. More-
over, although economists have often stressed the beneficial effects of
comprehensive disaster insurance (Kunreuther 1968), politicians are often
reluctant to introduce insurance solutions and rather prefer recovery, either
in the form of reconstruction or ex post compensation to victims. The litera-
ture has indicated many reasons why politicians prefer disaster recovery
policy over insurance. One explanation is that there are concentrated benefits
(to victims living in hazard-prone areas) and diffuse costs (to taxpayers);
another reason for continued federal reliance on disaster relief stems from the
extraordinary media coverage that catastrophes typically generate (Moss
2010).
Reconstruction is also criticized for encouraging inefficient location deci-
sions by potential disaster victims. Partly because of the endowment effect
(Novemsky and Kahneman 2005; Carmon and Ariely 2000; Thaler 1980),
government rebuilding often occurs in previously destroyed hazard-prone
areas. Thus, “[m]any economists debated the wisdom of rebuilding New
Orleans and strengthening the protections against future flooding, given the
inherent riskiness of the Gulf Coast region” (Viscusi 2010, 145). Moreover,
automatic reconstruction in the wake of disasters may reinforce cognitive
mechanisms that distort the perception of risk (Pidot 2012). In principle,
recovery could enhance precaution by providing opportunities to reshape
destroyed communities in ways that improve their resilience to future
disasters. However, evidence shows “a strong bias on the part of decision-
makers towards maintaining the status quo” (Mileti 1999, 236), and thus,
local leaders fail to take advantage of the recovery period to increase pre-
cautionary measures. Moreover, local governments will have incentives to
maximize development in order to raise tax revenues, whereas they can
externalize the costs largely to the federal government paying for recovery
(Pidot 2012). This criticism also applies to subsidized insurance schemes,
such as the NFIP, which, by providing subsidies for flood insurance, both
prevents insurance companies from profitably offering competing policies
and “provides incentives for property development in high-risk areas”
(Young 2008, 566). Pidot (2012) argues that reconstruction in hazard-prone
locations following disasters is largely due to the metaphor of disaster as war.
By reconstructing the devastated area, the enemy can be defeated.
A final problem, common to both compensation and reconstruction, is
that the feedback effects of precaution on recovery, and vice versa, reinforce
each other. Recovery ex post is more necessary, salient, and mediagenic the
more vulnerable the disaster victims are ex ante. Thus, on the one hand, the
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availability of recovery reduces incentives for precaution; on the other hand,
reduced incentives for precaution make for bigger disasters and therefore
attract a larger amount of recovery, which further reduces victims’ and
governments’ incentives to undertake precautionary measures. In sum, the
traditional arguments against ex post government intervention after disasters
certainly apply as far as recovery (both compensation and reconstruction) are
concerned.
B. THE EFFECTS OF RELIEF ON PRECAUTION AND RECOVERY
The situation is different with respect to the effects of relief on precaution and
recovery. Disaster relief encompasses all those measures that must be taken
in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Intervention must be quick and
tailored to the situation. Disasters are unusual occurrences, abnormal situa-
tions caused by unpredicted natural events or human failures. Information
about how best to carry out disaster relief is most readily available ex post,
after the disaster has occurred. Ex ante, only limited, very general measures
can be taken—through trained rescue teams, evacuation plans, disaster man-
agement agencies, and concern control units—to prepare for such events. By
contrast, reconstruction efforts, whose costs and modes of execution can be
determined ex ante, consist of a series of common steps taken to rebuild and
restore the devastated area. Obviously, an ex post intervention is efficient
because it relies on information available at the moment, while ex ante
planning must be adapted to a host of hypothetical scenarios (Leonard and
Howitt 2010). We do not mean to suggest that the emergency response
should not involve any planning at all. Some relief actions can be planned in
anticipation of a disaster, but the real action takes place ex post.
Clarke (1999) shows that effective planning for relief is virtually impos-
sible, stressing the importance of ex post, ad hoc intervention. He argues,
moreover, that planning may include the creation of fantasy documents,
which are merely tools to convince the public that experts are in charge and
that all is well. Thus, Clarke argues that fantasy documents, as such, may
even increase risk by giving people a false sense of security. Planning a
reaction to a disaster is therefore only possible to some extent, as relief
actions will strongly depend upon the particular nature of the disaster.
But will the government provide optimal relief effort? Relief activities are
less affected by the problems of ex post political incentives than recovery
efforts. Of course, the problem can still arise, even in the case of immediate
emergency relief, that such actions have significant political (electoral)
benefits. Depoorter (2006) shows that, post-Katrina, various governments in
the United States literally competed to provide immediate relief, while prior
to Katrina, there was a lack of investment in Louisiana’s zoning regulation
and emergency planning. Because of the substantial political benefits of ex
post action, the reverse is true as well: there may be an oversupply of ex post
relief at the expense of precautionary measures. Yet, excessive relief is less
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problematic than excessive recovery precisely because it is optimal to respond
more energetically to major disasters than to minor ones, so that political
incentives go in the same direction as socially optimal choices.
1. Effects of Relief on Precaution
As relief actually reduces the social cost of disasters, some reduction in
precaution is warranted. However, victims might reduce precaution below
the socially optimal level because they do not bear the costs of relief effort.
Yet, there are reasons to believe that this problem is less serious with relief
than with recovery. Relief activities are aimed at the rescue of persons and
property, to limit (the probability of) severe damages. Very often, they fall
dramatically short of completely removing the possibility of property and
personal loss, leaving victims seriously harmed. Some harm, moreover—
including injury, loss of life, and loss of personal belongings—may be of a
noncompensable nature. For these relief activities, moral hazard is less of a
problem, as relief does not provide full compensation but merely mitigates
further damage. Relief measures are often aimed at saving lives and irreplace-
able belongings, often of a nonpecuniary nature. As the law and economics
literature has indicated, often there will be no demand for insurance on such
irreplaceable items or for nonpecuniary damage (Lindenbergh and
Kippersluis 2009; Cook and Graham 1977; Zeckhauser 1973). The inevitable
residual losses are likely to provide powerful incentives for victims to avoid
over-reliance on disaster recovery.
2. Effects of Relief on Recovery
Relief has an obvious beneficial effect on recovery: the more resources
are devoted to satisfying the immediate needs of the victims of a disaster,
the less need there is for recovery. Moreover, government relief is not nec-
essarily more expensive than victims’ relief. Our model shows that it is
simply better tailored to the situation. On balance, the total expenditures
in relief could be the same with and without government intervention.
Even keeping costs constant, government intervention makes relief more
efficient.
This implies that more catastrophic events will be met with more energetic
responses. Thus, the direct effect of government relief effort is a narrowing of
the spread of losses. Major disasters result in less harm (while minor disasters
might result in more harm) than with victims’ relief. This in turn has two
effects on recovery. First, it reduces recovery costs in major disasters and,
second, it curbs political incentives to oversupply recovery, hence alleviating
the dilution of incentives with ex ante precaution. The latter effect is due to
the salience of major disasters in the news. The bigger the scale of harm, the
more attention and funds will be drawn to recovery. Hence, applying relief
effort and reducing the magnitude of the loss is likely to result in cheaper and
less inefficient recovery ex post.
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VII. OPTIMAL RELIEF
Although provision of relief can be handled by private actors, local authori-
ties, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), there are strong arguments
in favor of central coordination of relief efforts. We will examine these in
turn.
A. SCALE, SPEED, AND SCOPE
Disaster relief clearly has a public good character. As a result, private parties
may have no incentive to take such measures, and government may be best
placed to do so. Second, there may be large economies of scale in immediate
disaster relief; whereas long-term restoration (e.g., rebuilding houses) could
be handled by private parties, coordinated action by government in provid-
ing immediate relief is likely to be cost effective. The scale and suddenness of
relief activities may require the quick pooling of immense resources and an
effective coordination effort in a short period of time. Both pooling and
coordination suggest that relief activities are best managed at a centralized
level. In contrast, reconstruction activities can be spread over a longer time
period, requiring less pooling and coordination. In the words of Trebilcock
and Daniels (2006, 92):
The case for intervention is heightened when government-sponsored infrastruc-
ture projects enjoy significant economies of scale, require the exercise of powers
of eminent domain to develop the projects, and/or exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics. As with many other forms of public infrastructure, this appears
to be true of precautions, such as construction of dams, levees, dikes, and other
forms of flood works where public involvement would seem likely to yield more
socially optimal levels of investment than purely private decision-making.
However, there are also contrary arguments. The dramatic failure of FEMA
during the week of, and just after, hurricane Katrina led to some skepticism
regarding the need for government intervention in relief activities. Shughart
(2011, 529), for example, argues that disaster relief is a poor public good:
The immediate task required of first responders is to supply what are essentially
private goods. Rescuing survivors from the rooftops of flooded homes and
businesses or digging them out of the rubble are rivalrous activities. Everyone
in immediate danger cannot be moved to safety simultaneously; when a rescue-
crew is working to locate survivors at one disaster scene, others necessarily
must wait their turns.
He therefore doubts that disaster relief is an activity in which the government
has a distinct comparative advantage. Moreover, Ahmed and Iqbal (2009)
have also shown empirically that an elected government at the local level does
not necessarily help to mitigate disaster risks. Only when political decentral-
ization is accompanied by fiscal decentralization can activities at the lowest
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tier of government significantly reduce total deaths. The argument is that
greater fiscal responsibility makes a local elected government more respon-
sive to vulnerable people.
B. SECURITY
One of the important goals of relief measures is to guarantee security.
Without security, relief measures may fail altogether, as individuals, fearful
of looting or violence, may be hesitant to follow an evacuation order. This
problem was one of the reasons for the high death toll after Katrina, where
many failed to evacuate after the mandatory evacuation order. As Landy
(2008, 188) notes:
Undoubtedly, individuals who could have left had strong reasons not to obey
the order. They feared looting. They treated the evacuation order as just
another case of the government crying wolf. The presence of so many people in
the flooded area was the reason so many people died. This act of civil disobe-
dience, far more than any failures on the part of emergency responders, led to
the high death toll.
This shows that a primary reason for the government to intervene in relief
actions is to guarantee security. If individuals in a disaster area fear looting
and increased crime, relief actions may fail, and as the case of Katrina shows,
an increased death toll may result.
C. BALANCING OF RIGHTS
In aiding one party, the property of another may be damaged or destroyed.
In private law, the common law doctrines of state of necessity and self-
defense address similar dilemmas in ordinary situations (see, for instance,
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 63–87, 196–97). However, disasters occa-
sion these dilemmas on a large scale, so that government oversight may be
required. Two problems may arise. First, individuals may infringe recipro-
cally (even if justifiably) on each other’s rights, creating a potential for
violence. Second, disasters create situations in which it is difficult to gather
evidence to assess, ex post, whether infringements were legally founded or
not; thus, there is a potential for abuse. The state is in the best position to
balance and protect individual rights and guarantee order. Moreover, De
Geest (2012) argues that it is important to provide the government involved
in such tasks with immunity.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a distinction between three relevant sets of activities that
can be undertaken to reduce the probability or magnitude of disasters:
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precaution, relief, and recovery. To the extent that precaution and recovery
are substitutes, the prospect of ex post recovery efforts reduces the incentives
of potential victims and governments to take precautions; victims can count
on government ex post intervention, and politicians prefer making funds
available ex post rather than ex ante. Moreover, a lack of ex ante precaution
leaves victims more vulnerable to disaster and therefore makes recovery more
necessary and salient ex post, reinforcing the effect. In contrast, relief and
precaution are complements; thus, relief efforts tend to reduce precautionary
efforts less than recovery does. Relief and recovery, on the other hand, are
substitutes, so that possibly excessive relief efforts will reduce recovery costs
ex post, resulting in relatively small net social costs. Therefore, most of the
criticisms of government intervention that we have examined refer to recov-
ery and apply only in a limited way to relief. Thus, while recognizing the
problems associated with government recovery efforts, our analysis supports
government relief efforts.
Undoubtedly, the literature that was criticizing ex post intervention did
not object to the government providing shelter and immediate help in the
aftermath of a disaster; however, we showed that one has to carefully
distinguish between the different types of ex post intervention, more
particularly distinguishing between relief and recovery. The case of hurri-
cane Katrina moreover shows that de facto large amounts of ex post spend-
ing go to relief rather than to recovery in the sense of victim compensation.
Still, the mere fact that the criticism does apply to compensation and less to
relief and reconstruction does not mean that all relief or reconstruction
actions are necessarily cost effective. In the aftermath of Katrina, many
criticisms were heard in that respect. However, we argued and also
showed in the model that those potentially negative consequences of relief,
as far as incentives for precaution are concerned, are to a large extent out-
weighed by the benefits that are generated by relief, which is not the case
for recovery.
Several issues that we touched upon undoubtedly merit a more in-depth
analysis. We, for example, strongly argue that the government may be best
placed to provide relief. However, in some cases, private parties or NGOs
intervene in providing relief as well; the optimal division of labor between
both surely merits further research. Also, our analysis largely applies to the
case of natural disasters. For man-made disasters, an additional complica-
tion is created by the fact that incentives would have to be provided to a liable
tortfeasor for efficient precautionary measures, and for balancing those pre-
cautionary measures with effective relief and recovery. While our general
results remain valid, the intervention of the tortfeasor raises questions about
the optimal division of labor between the government and the tortfeasor
as far as relief and recovery are concerned. The recent case of the disaster
with the offshore rig Deepwater Horizon shows that interesting issues arise in
that respect as well (such as whether the tortfeasor should equally finance
relief efforts), which equally merit further research. Moreover, the brief
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discussion of Katrina also illustrated a general point made in the literature:
there will be underinvestment in precaution. To some extent, those underin-
vestments may lead to the liability of public authorities whereby the question
equally arises to what extent public authority liability could provide a remedy
to incentivize authorities toward optimal investments in precaution. Those
and other related questions can and will undoubtedly be addressed in further
research.
NOTES
1. Insurers in Japan have a differentiated premium system. Depending on whether
constructions are of wood or stone (the latter being safer than the former) and
whether an earthquake-safe construction technology is chosen, differentiated pre-
miums apply. See Report: Japan 6.
2. The essence of our argument is that it is efficient that the government provides
some level of relief in the aftermath of a disaster and that relief effort reduces the
costs of precaution (ex ante) and recovery (ex post). The argument is not based on
who takes precaution ex ante, and hence holds both if victims take precaution and
if the government takes precaution. In the model we focus on victims’ precaution:
for instance, victims might decide to locate far away from a dam. However, in
reality, it is often optimal and it in fact happens that the government takes pre-
caution: the government could build safer dams, for instance. Yet, our argument
about relief is even stronger when the government takes precaution. This is because
when the government pays for precaution, relief, and recovery, the dilution of
incentives that we identify with victim precaution in the model does not occur.
Hence the efficiency gains are larger.
3. This assumption does not affect the results. Any finite range of damage indexes
[dmin, dmax] can be mapped onto the unit interval [0, 1] by means of a simple linear
transformation. In the real world, damages occur along a continuum of possibili-
ties and precautionary effort changes the probability density function of the real-
ization of damages. Considering a simple case with only two damage levels
simplifies the analysis while preserving the essential elements of the problem. Note
further that dL and dH are simply indexes of the two types of disasters. The realized
damages will depend on the relief effort r as explained in the text. Once divided by
very small levels of r, damages can be larger than unity and possibly very large.
4. Note that p∧ = 0 if s > 1 − dL / dH; that is, if the government takes up a very large
portion of the recovery costs or if the difference between high and low damages is
too narrow.
5. The second-order conditions for p and r and the condition for an internal station-
ary point to be a maximum are satisfied. In the analysis, we only focus on internal
solutions but note that there are ranges of values for the damages that require
p = 0 or p = 1. Our analysis also applies to these cases.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. We have p∧ = (sdH − dL) / 2 < dH − dL = p*. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The result follows from the fact that dL2 < p∧∧dL2 + (1 − p∧∧)dH2
< dH2. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows from the fact that Proposition 2 implies dH2
/ 4r∧∧ > dH2 / 4rH* and dL2 / 4r∧∧ < dL2 / 4 rL*. Thus, we have p∧∧ = (1 − s)dH2 / 4r∧∧ −
dL2 / 4r∧∧ > (1 − s)dH2 / 4rH* − dL2 / 4rL* = p∧. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Increasing s reduces p∧∧ for any level of r∧∧ and, likewise, it
reduces r∧∧ for any level of p∧∧. Since from the implicit definitions given in the text
p∧∧ decreases in r∧∧ and r∧∧ decreases in p∧∧, graphical inspection shows that either
p∧∧ or r∧∧ or both decrease as s increases. Q.E.D.
The Model with Government Precaution. The government could take precau-
tion in order to reduce the probability of disasters. Crucially, government
precaution is observable to victims and hence the choice of precaution by
the government and the victim can be thought of as a sequential game,
where the government sets the precaution level at time −2, before the
victim acts. To model government precaution we can think of the prob-
ability of disasters as P(q, p), that is as a function of the precautionary
effort of the victim p and of that of the government q. Since q is observable
to the victim at time −1, the probability of disasters is, after government
precaution has been exerted, uniquely determined by the victim’s
precaution. For any level of government precaution q there will be a
subgame starting at time −1, which has the characteristics of our model
and yields analogous results. Therefore, we can consider government pre-
caution as a background variable and focus on the variables of interest; all
our results will be essentially preserved. Studying specifically the optimal
mix of government and victim precaution is a standard problem in models
of torts with two actors acting sequentially and its characteristics are well
understood (see for instance Shavell 1983; Wittman 1981).
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